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Counter-Terrorist Judicial Review as Regulatory Constitutionalism 
 
Fiona de Londras 
 
As the other contributions in this volume attest, since 9/11 courts, inquiries,
1
 politics
2
 and 
independent reviewers
3
 have been working to try to maintain and enforce constitutionalist 
principles in the face of counter-terrorist powers. Experience has shown that politics has 
struggled to resolve the challenges these powers pose to constitutionalism
4—broadly 
understood here as a rule of law based commitment to limited, accountable and transparent 
power—so that courts have become central to resolving these tensions. In large part, courts 
have been asked to deal with counter-terrorist policies and laws directly imposed on litigants 
by respondent states, in relation to which some commentators have claimed courts are being 
less deferential than might have been expected.
5
 Adjacent to these kinds of cases, however, is 
the complex situation of the suspected terrorist with some kind of relational connection to one 
state who is either detained abroad by another state or by his own state, which intends to 
transfer him into the custody of another. These cases are truly acute; they bring into question 
not only the fine lines of rights protection and security activity, but also complex and vital 
questions of institutional competence heightened by the ‘foreign affairs’ context. Their acute 
nature allows for them to be an especially stern test for any claims that courts are in fact 
engaging in muscular counter-terrorist judicial review. Thus, in this chapter, I explore such 
cases across three jurisdictions in an attempt to explore what it is that courts are doing.  
 
Through an analysis of three cases from Canada, the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK), I argue that courts are quite carefully carving these kinds of cases into 
conceptual pieces—which I classify as internal and external questions—to engage in what I 
term regulatory constitutionalism. Here internal questions speak to the relationship between 
the suspected terrorist and the respondent state, whereas external questions concern the 
relationship between the respondent and third party states as it relates to the suspected 
terrorist. When dealing with internal questions, I argue courts are muscular notwithstanding 
the broader ‘external’ context in which they are considered, but when it comes to external 
questions a substantial amount of deference is apparent. This begs the question of whether 
such internal muscularity is worthwhile if external deference remains, however I argue that 
understanding counter-terrorist judicial review as a mechanism of regulatory 
constitutionalism provides at least some reassurance to constitutionalists. 
  
This argument rests to a large extent on a starting position that considers judicial review 
(construed broadly) to be an important manifestation of regulatory constitutionalism. I define 
regulatory constitutionalism as a process through which information about governmental 
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behaviour can be gathered, standards outlining the appropriate parameters of governmental 
authority outlined by reference to constitutionalist principles of limited and accountable 
power, and governmental behaviour ultimately modified to align more clearly with the 
constitutionalist ideal outlined in these standards. This builds on an understanding of 
regulation as involving information gathering, standard setting and behaviour modification
6
 
as well as David Feldman’s characterisation of judicial review as having directing, limiting, 
and structuring effects on government,
7
 to which—following the Human Rights Act 1998—
Harlow & Rawlings have added ‘vindicating’.8 This view of the role of judicial review is not 
by any means universally held, and certainly not in the United Kingdom where the superior 
courts have not traditionally had an ‘apex’ review role of this nature in spite of the 
increasingly constitutionalist approach to judicial review that has been developing over the 
past few decades in that jurisdiction.
9
 If we understand the constitution as more than merely 
political and in fact as an autonomously limiting instrument, such a development is relatively 
undisturbing (if not, perhaps, welcome) and a comparison along these lines with the 
traditionally ‘apex’ US Supreme Court and increasingly ‘apex’ Canadian Supreme Court can 
be usefully constructed. Although not a universally held view of the function and legitimacy 
of judicial review, this is my starting point in this chapter. 
 
I. The Cases 
 
The three cases that are considered here, from Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, raise difficult questions for courts, which are asked to make orders protecting the 
rights of suspected terrorists held abroad; orders which, if granted, would have implications 
not only for claims of security imperatives but also for comity between states.  
 
a. Khadr  
 
Omar Khadr was fifteen when he was detained by the US in Afghanistan after allegedly 
throwing a grenade that resulted in the death of a US soldier. Having been moved to 
Guantánamo Bay, Khadr was charged with war crimes in 2004. He was interrogated by 
agents of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (in 2003) and the Foreign Intelligence 
Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (in 2003 and 2004). 
The transcripts of these interviews were shared with the US, and the 2004 interview 
proceeded in spite of the fact that the Canadian personnel knew that Khadr had been 
subjected to sleep deprivation techniques for three weeks. 
 
Before this case, Khadr had already obtained orders from the Canadian courts prohibiting any 
further interviews by Canadian agents
10
 and compelling the disclosure of interview 
transcripts to him,
11
 in both of which cases a violation of s. 7 of the Charter was found. In 
contrast, Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr
12
 was decidedly ‘external’, with Khadr seeking an 
order compelling the government to make representations to the US seeking his repatriation. 
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This forced the Supreme Court of Canada to reconcile its own already established position 
that Khadr’s Charter rights had been violated, with strong executive-based arguments for 
non-interference with the conduct of foreign affairs.  
 
The Court reiterated its earlier view that Canadian agents’ involvement in Khadr’s detention 
breached Canada’s international legal obligations and fundamental rights norms and, thus, 
this case fell into the exceptional situations when the Charter could be applied to extra-
territorial activity.
13
 The Court held that Canada’s involvement contributed to the continuing 
deprivation of Khadr’s liberty because of the use of information elicited through an interview 
by Canadian agents. Thus, an internal question was established and constructed: was there a 
breach of s. 7 of the Charter? The Court found that there was a “sufficient causal 
connection”14 between Canada’s activity and Khadr’s detention to apply the Charter and find 
a breach of s. 7.  
 
Once a breach of s. 7 was established as regards the internal question, the Court had to decide 
what remedy would be appropriate. Khadr sought a mandatory order requiring the Canadian 
government to make diplomatic representations to the US for repatriation. Within Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence it is well established that breaches of Charter rights must be 
answered with an appropriate and just order “that meaningfully vindicates the rights and 
freedoms of the claimant[]”.15 Furthermore, the remedy must “employ means that are 
legitimate within the framework of our constitutional democracy”16 and “invoke[e] the 
functions and powers of a court”.17 Although the exercise of foreign affairs powers in the 
context of making representations to another government was within the prerogative power of 
the executive, the Court held that this did not exempt such exercise from constitutional 
scrutiny.
18
 However, the strictness of that scrutiny and, in particular, the forcefulness of any 
remedy ordered in relation to same, would—it quickly became clear—be limited by 
pragmatic concerns of institutional competence and comity. Thus, while the possibility of 
remedy was an internal question, the nature of the remedy was clearly impacted by the 
external question. Paragraph 37 of the judgment reads: 
 
The limited power of the courts to review exercises of the prerogative power 
for constitutionality reflects the fact that in a constitutional democracy, all 
government power must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. 
This said, judicial review of the exercise of the prerogative power for 
constitutionality remains sensitive to the fact that the executive branch of 
government is responsible for decisions under this power, and that the 
executive is better placed to make such decisions within a range of 
constitutional options….[I]t is for the courts to determine the legal and 
constitutional limits within which such decisions are to be taken. It follows 
that in the case of refusal by a government to abide by constitutional 
constraints, courts are empowered to make orders ensuring that the 
government’s foreign affairs prerogative is exercised in accordance with the 
constitution. 
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The Court went on to hold that where one is under the control of another state, sufficient 
weight must be given to the executive’s foreign affairs role and the complex and ever-
changing needs of the national interest. Taking all of this into account, and considering the 
fact that Khadr was detained by the United States, that a governmental representation 
requesting repatriation would not necessarily succeed, and that the Court was not fully 
appraised of the nature of the diplomatic exchanges between the two governments in this 
case, no such mandatory order would be granted. Instead the Court found  that declaratory 
relief (by means of declaring the breach of Khadr’s Charter rights) was the appropriate 
remedy.
19
 
 
b. Munaf  
 
Munaf concerned the detention of two American citizens by the Multinational Force-Iraq 
(MNF-I) in Iraq. Shaqi Omar was a US/Jordanian citizen detained in 2004 and suspected of 
granting aid to Abu al-Zarqawi while he was the head of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Omar was given a 
military tribunal, deemed a ‘security internee’ and ‘enemy combatant’ and referred to the 
Central Criminal Court for Iraq for investigation. He remained in the custody of the MNF-I at 
Camp Cropper—a camp under the full operational control of the American military—as at an 
earlier stage he had succeeded in securing an order prohibiting his transfer to Iraqi custody, 
his handover to Iraq for investigation or prosecution, and the sharing of any information 
relating to his release with the Iraqi government. Mohammed Munaf was a US/Iraqi citizen 
who had gone to Iraq as a translator for some Romanian journalists. Those journalists were 
subsequently kidnapped by Al Qaeda, as was Munaf, and upon their release Munaf was 
arrested by the MNF-I on suspicion of having orchestrated the kidnap. As with Omar, Munaf 
was given a military tribunal and deemed a ‘security internee’. His case was also referred to 
the Central Criminal Court for Iraq where he was prosecuted and convicted for kidnapping. 
During his trial Munaf confessed in writing and on camera to having orchestrated the kidnap 
but this confession was recanted while the trial was still in process. Munaf was convicted of 
kidnapping, but his conviction was vacated by the Iraqi Court of Cassation, which remanded 
him in custody for further investigation. Munaf was also detained by the MNF-I in Camp 
Cropper and had failed in his attempt to secure an injunction against transfer or release on the 
basis of a lack of jurisdiction. 
 
The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases, both of which raised two significant issues: 
(1) whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from the detainees, and (2) 
whether the Court could order the US not to transfer the petitioners into Iraqi custody or 
allow them to be tried by Iraqi courts by means of the preliminary (or interlocutory) 
injunction sought. These questions are clearly capable of being broken down into internal and 
external matters, the internal question being as to jurisdiction and the external question being 
as to the order sought.   
 
As to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that it was an American unit (Task Force 134) that 
oversaw all detention operations and facilities in question, including Camp Cropper, and that 
in fact the unit was under the command of the US and answered only to a US chain of 
command. That was sufficient to satisfy the statutory jurisdiction requirement of being 
detained “under or by colour of the authority of the United States”20 but even if this was not 
compelling on its own, citizenship was sufficient to establish the jurisdictional link.
21
 This 
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reasoning suggests that the Supreme Court considered the jurisdictional question to be an 
internal one: a question about the relationship between the US and a US detainee (who 
happened to be a citizen).  
 
In contrast, Roberts CJ writing for a unanimous Court, placed the question of relief clearly 
within the realm of the ‘external’. It was, he held, a question of “whether United States 
district courts may exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin our Armed Forced from 
transferring individuals detained within another sovereign territory to that sovereign’s 
government for criminal prosecution”. With that sentence defining the issue at hand, the 
Court essentially stepped away from its internal construction of the jurisdiction question and 
reconstructed the case in an external manner, holding that when it came to remedy it must 
take into account the fact that this was “inevitably entangled in the conduct of our 
international relations”.22  
 
The petitioners had sought orders prohibiting both transfer to Iraq and release in Iraq itself; 
reliefs that the Court held “would interfere with Iraq’s sovereign right to punish offenses 
against its laws committed within its borders’”. Given the equitable nature of habeas relief, 
the Court would proceed along what it considered to be the prudent course and, taking into 
account what was considered to be the extraordinary nature of the relief sought, prudence 
dictated that no relief be granted. Roberts CJ correctly held that “At the end of the day, what 
petitioners are really after is a court order requiring the United States to shelter them from the 
sovereign government seeking to have them answer for alleged crimes committed within that 
sovereign’s borders”.23 The Court held that any order that would, in essence, “compel[] the 
United States to harbour fugitives from the criminal justice system of a sovereign with 
undoubted authority to prosecute them”24 could not be granted. The Court simply would not 
countenance any such order, especially since “Omar and Munaf are being held by the United 
States Armed Forces at the behest of the Iraqi Government pending their prosecution in Iraqi 
courts”.  
 
The petitioners were, thus, simultaneously held “under the color” of the US (to establish 
jurisdiction; the internal construction of the case) and by proxy for the Iraqi government (to 
refuse relief; the external construction of the case). Indeed, so strongly did the Court 
construct the external element of the case as one in which the Iraqi government was 
implicated that it concluded that “Any requirement that the MNF-I release a detainee would, 
in effect, impose a release order on the Iraqi government”.25 Concerns about comity, foreign 
relations and the need not to interfere with executive conduct of same were equally clear in 
the Court’s response to the petitioners’ claim that their risk of being subjected to torture in 
Iraqi custody trumped any considerations already expressed in relation to granting the order 
sought. Questions about the likelihood or otherwise of torture were, the Court held, “a matter 
of serious concern” but “to be addressed by the political branches, not the judiciary”.26 This is 
once again because of the Court’s concern with treading on executive toes in relation to 
foreign and diplomatic relations. For courts to make such determinations would “require 
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federal courts to pass judgements on foreign justice systems and undermine the 
Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this area”.27  
 
c. Rahmatullah  
 
Although Rahmatullah
28
 concerns a British subject, rather than a UK citizen,
29
 the case raises 
interesting and analogous issues to those arising in Khadr and Munaf and is a further example 
of the internal/external approach outlined above. In this case issues that were external at first 
blush were reconstructed as internal, by means of which reconstruction a relatively muscular 
approach was taken by the Court of Appeal. Rahmatullah is a Pakistani citizen who was 
captured by UK forces in Iraq in 2004 and subsequently handed over to US forces, which 
detained him in Bagram near Kabul, Afghanistan. He remained there since June 2004, 
notwithstanding a Detainee Review Board
30
 finding in June 2010 that his continued detention 
was unnecessary and that he should be released to Pakistan.  
 
At the time that Rahmatullah was handed over to the US, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the two countries and Australia was in effect. This MOU
31
 provided inter 
alia that it would be implemented in compliance with the Geneva Conventions and 
customary international law (Clause 1), that any detainees would be returned to the original 
transferring power “without delay upon request” (Clause 4), that release or transfer of a 
detainee outside of Iraq would take place only pursuant to mutual agreement between the 
relevant powers (Clause 5), that the transferring power had full right of access to detainees 
while they are in the custody of another of the signing parties (Clause 6), and that all 
detainees would be treated as prisoners of war in advance of a determination under Article 4 
and 5 of the Third Geneva Convention (Clause 9). A second MOU was agreed in October 
2008 (and signed by the UK in March 2009), which provided that all detainees transferred by 
one power to another would be treated “in accordance with applicable principles of 
international law, including humanitarian law” while in the custody of the US (Paragraph 
4).
32
 Although not legally binding, these memoranda were clearly intended to govern the 
treatment of detainees captured in Iraq and to commit the parties to compliance with relevant 
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Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 1540, [3]-[6]. 
32
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international legal standards. Rahmatullah claimed that his continued detention was a 
violation of the Geneva Conventions and that the UK either enjoyed a sufficient level of 
control over him to secure his release or that there was at least a doubt about whether such 
control lay with the UK.
33
 As a result habeas corpus was sought either in the normal way or 
in order to allow for the question of control to be determined. In response, it was argued that 
the UK did not exercise sufficient control for the writ to issue and that, furthermore, issuance 
of the writ would require the UK Government to make a request of the US which would 
involve the court in foreign relations. 
 
This case was a complex one, concerning as it did three areas of real sensitivity: the conduct 
of hostilities, the interpretation and legal effect of MOUs, and bilateral foreign relations. The 
net question in legal terms was one of control: was the applicant under the control of the UK 
to allow the writ to issue or was there sufficient doubt as to that question to justify the 
issuance of the writ? Although this appears to be an essentially internal question, its handling 
of this case required the Court to pay significant attention to whether or not the US was in 
breach of its international legal obligations; a consideration with more than a hint of 
externality about it. The Court’s treatment of this question ultimately fed into the decision as 
to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus ought to issue; it also centrally concerned Article 
45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which includes the following provision: 
 
If protected persons are transferred under such circumstances, 
responsibility for the application of the present Convention rests on the 
Power accepting them, while they are in its custody. Nevertheless, if that 
Power fails to carry out the provisions of the present Convention in any 
important respect, the Power by which the protected persons were 
transferred shall, upon being so notified by the Protecting Power, take 
effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the 
protected persons. Such request must be complied with. 
 
Based on Article 45, together with the MOUs and the fact that Rahmatullah’s continued 
detention had been deemed unnecessary by the Detainee Review Board the Court of Appeal 
held that “the UK Government is, again at least strongly arguably…entitled either to demand 
his release or to demand his return to UK custody under Article 45”.34 If the failure to release 
Rahmatullah was a breach of the Geneva Conventions, the nexus between him and the UK 
would be reactivated and failure to act under Article 45 potentially engaged s. 1 of the 
Geneva Conventions Act 1957. According to the Court of Appeal, this possibility resulted in 
sufficient uncertainty as to the UK’s control over the applicant to justify issuing a writ of 
habeas corpus.  
 
Here the internal question was a complex one that involved matters of international law and 
may have required an oblique finding of a violation of international obligations by another 
state (making it quasi-external), but the Court ensured that it remained a fundamentally 
internal question in relation to which at least some muscularity could be displayed. Once this 
question had been dealt with, there was still the possibility that the writ would not issue, 
especially as the argument against issuance was essentially that any request to the US would 
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be futile and that an order of habeas corpus would involve the court in the ‘forbidden’ area of 
foreign relations. The Court held that it was by no means certain that the US would refuse to 
hand the applicant over and this, combined with the nature of habeas corpus within the 
British Constitution, pointed strongly in the direction of issuing the writ. The Court held that 
the argument as to foreign relations did not hold water, primarily because the argument was 
not made out in any real detail by the Secretaries of State. However, the Master of the Rolls 
also noted (albeit obiter) that the writ of habeas corpus can issue even where it might impede 
diplomatic relations,
35
 and Kay LJ reiterated that the forbidden area continues to exist.
36
 
Accordingly, the writ of habeas corpus issued.  
 
Rahmatullah, which could so easily have been unsuccessful if construed solely as an external 
case was instead constructed as an internal case, concerned with the UK’s control and 
capacity based on the MOUs and the Geneva Conventions. The Court studiously maintained 
the notion that muscularity would not be appropriate in truly external cases, but neatly 
ensured that this case simply did not fall into that limited field. If it had done, then it seems 
clear to me that the applicant would not have succeeded.
37
 Rahmatullah also, however, serves 
as a cautionary tale, for the aftermath of the original decision demonstrates how limited 
domestic courts can be in handing down remedies in these cases, even where an internal 
question is constructed. The US government refused to hand Rahmatullah over in pursuance 
of the habeas corpus order
38
 and there were no means, within the handover protocols 
between the UK and the US, though which the UK government could compel the US to do 
so. Following up on the issuance of the writ in February 2012, the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that their writ could not secure Mr Rahmatullah’s appearance before the Court 
but nevertheless rejected any suggestion that it had been futile to issue it in the first place.
39
 
Addressing this point, Neuberger MR (as he then was) held: 
 
That does not mean that the issue of the writ of habeas corpus was a pointless 
exercise in this case: it performed its minimum function of requiring the UK 
Government to account for its responsibility for the applicant's detention, and 
to attempt to get him released.
40
 
 
On appeal in the UK Supreme Court the decision to issue the writ was upheld and the 
implications that the United States was acting in violation of the Geneva Conventions 
reiterated.
41
 In the Supreme Court the government placed somewhat more weight on the 
claims that the issuance of the writ was inappropriate on foreign affairs grounds and in 
addressing this argument Kerr LJ resolutely reiterated the prior characterisation of the habeas 
question as an internal one. He absolutely rejected any contention that issuing the writ 
constituted an impermissible interference with foreign affairs, holding: 
 
[T]he Court of Appeal’s decision does not amount to an “instruction” to the 
Government to demand Mr Rahmatullah’s return. Its judgment merely reflects the 
court’s conclusion that there were sufficient grounds for believing that the UK 
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Government had the means of obtaining control over the custody of Mr Rahmatullah. 
… It might well prove that the only means of establishing whether in fact it could 
obtain control was for the Government to ask for his return but that remained a matter 
for the ministers concerned.
42
  
 
The decision in Rahmatullah, and particularly Neuberger LJ’s comments recalled above, lead 
us neatly to the core question that arises in all three of these cases: what is the point in a court 
taking an internally muscular and externally deferential approach in these cases? If, in the 
end, no (effective) order mandating a particular activity or course of action can be handed 
down, is this internal muscularity not simply a futile exercise leaving an unregulated and 
unlimited power in the context of foreign affairs, even where fundamental matters of 
individual liberty are at issue? The answer, I contend, depends on how one reads these cases. 
 
II. The Judicial Technique of Internal/External Construction 
 
Cases of this kind raise distinct and problematic issues as the applicants involved seem to ask 
courts to tread into the ‘forbidden area’ of foreign affairs43 to issue orders that, while directly 
addressed to their own governments, could be interpreted as being effectively addressed to 
the governments of a third state and have clear implications for foreign and diplomatic 
relations. At the same time, there is a legitimate concern with ensuring that ‘citizens’ (a term 
I use very broadly here in a sociological rather than a legal sense) are not left at the mercy of 
foreign powers, particularly when there is good reason to believe that they are or will be 
treated in a manner that would not be considered acceptable should the treatment in question 
be meted out by the respondent state. Courts, then, find themselves in something of a 
quandary, which Khadr, Munaf and Rahmatullah suggest they can resolve by constructing the 
case as being divisible into internal and external questions. 
 
On the one hand the conventional division of competence between the judicial and executive 
branch militates against intervention, while on the other the concern with citizen welfare 
suggests that something ought to be done. The weight of the first concern should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, it is so weighty as to be capable of overriding legal bonds of 
citizenship as a basis for intervention; the cases above show that mere citizenship was not 
enough to justify judicial supervision. Something more was required, such as the involvement 
of Canadian agents in Khadr. Once such a nexus can be established, the ‘internal question’ 
presents itself for consideration and courts adjudicate on it in the normal way, 
notwithstanding the ‘emergency’, ‘war’ or ‘crisis’ setting in which the question has arisen. 
 
Once a sufficient link between the detainee and the respondent state has been identified, a 
second difficulty may arise. While these cases suggest that courts are willing to be relatively 
non-deferential towards the executive in terms of ‘internal’ questions,44 ‘external’ questions 
belong to a greater degree to the ‘pure’ executive realm of foreign affairs into which courts 
are understandably reluctant to wander. In this context, the questions of comity and executive 
competence that arise are exacerbated by the counter-terrorist context. The ‘external’ 
question concerns the relationship between the state and the detainee as it relates to the state’s 
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relationship with another state and tends to implicate considerations as to remedy and, in 
particular, the extent to which courts can (or, perhaps more accurately, will) hand down 
orders that prescribe a certain kind of inter-state engagement. Here the cases above suggest 
that there is what seems to be a self-imposed limitation on judicial muscularity whereby 
courts are unwilling to grant such orders or, at least, to acknowledge that the orders they 
might grant (which are ostensibly relevant to the ‘internal’ question only) have implications 
for foreign relations.  
 
In some respects at least, this self-imposed limitation is linked to considerations of judicial 
competence, implications for comity, and an appreciation of the nature of inter-state 
diplomacy as a cautious and sensitive enterprise and one in which mandatory orders may do 
more harm than good. That said, for those who consider the judicial role to be one of 
maintaining constitutionalist principles, apparent self-imposed limitations are worrying; if 
there really is a ‘forbidden area’ into which the courts will not tread by means of judicial 
review, can judicial review truly be said to be a constitutionalist exercise? In my view the 
cases of Khadr, Munaf and Rahmatullah suggest that it can be, because the forbidden area is 
not left entirely unregulated by domestic courts. Rather, the construction of the case as having 
both an internal and an external element means that legitimate judicial intervention can take 
place in relation to the internal question that has implications for the external question, even 
while the optical illusion that the court has not wandered into foreign affairs persists. In this 
way, domestic courts seem to maintain an appropriate degree of institutional respect for 
genuine concerns of comity and competence when it comes to foreign affairs, while 
simultaneously creating conditions where interactions with third countries may be influenced 
by constitutionalist concerns and principles enforced by the courts, i.e. engaging in regulatory 
constitutionalism.  
 
III. Regulatory Constitutionalism and the Apparent Self-Imposed Limitation on 
Judicial Muscularity 
 
There are two—not necessarily conflicting—ways of interpreting the pattern identified in 
these three cases. The first is to read them as a ‘constitutionalist optimist’, seeing within them 
considerable muscularity and a resistance to the suggestion that context (i.e. terrorism and 
conflict) or actor (i.e. executive) ought necessarily to usher in deference by the courts, 
especially when core constitutionalist principles are at issue. On the other hand, a 
‘constitutionalist pessimist’ might see them as perpetuating an essentially unreviewable area 
of executive power. The latter reading raises important questions of legitimacy. For those, 
like me, who consider counter-terrorist judicial review to be (ideally) an exercise in 
regulatory constitutionalism, such an approach raises the question of whether it is legitimate 
for the courts to be muscular on the one hand but to cultivate a fertile ground of potential 
abuse on the other. It causes one to ask whether the maintenance of the ‘forbidden area’ 
severely undermines the existence of the reviewed area, and makes rights protection 
essentially contingent on circumstances beyond the control of the individual whose rights are 
jeopardised. These questions are important ones. They give rise to the possibility that in 
appearing to be ‘muscular’, courts are in fact flexing just enough muscle to appear relevant or 
maintain their own role, while leaving sufficient space for governments to do as they wish 
provided they do it in the right conceptual or geographical space.
45
 If, indeed, that were the 
case it would undermine the constitutionalist nature of the muscularity witnessed in the 
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‘internal’ questions. I argue, however, that in fact the maintenance and acknowledgment of 
the forbidden area in respect of external questions together with the identification and 
muscular adjudication of internal questions may be mutually reconcilable and appropriate 
judicial approaches demonstrating a commitment to regulatory constitutionalism. 
 
This requires us to acknowledge that even while not adjudicating on the external question, 
courts can and do make ‘soft findings’ that have an important regulatory impact on 
government action.
46
 In Khadr
47
 the Canadian Supreme Court found that the conditions of 
Khadr’s detention and interrogation were such as to violate the Charter, thus making a clear 
(and pejorative) finding with political, even if not legal, consequences, about the US. 
Similarly, in Rahmatullah
48
 the superior courts effectively found that the US was acting in 
violation of the Geneva Conventions by holding Rahmatullah in Bagram after his eligibility 
for release had been determined. Although no such conclusion can be clearly drawn from 
Munaf (apart from a suggestion that the conditions of trial in Iraq might not be equal to the 
due process guarantees under the US Constitution
49
), both Khadr and Rahmatullah suggest 
the potential for some obtuse conclusions to be reached about the external actors or actions 
under consideration, even when no order can be made in relation to same. This can in turn 
have an important impact on government action in relation to the litigant and the particular 
case in question provided it receives political attention.
50
 Through publicisation, the non-
binding nature of these elements of the decision may be mitigated by infusion with regulatory 
capacity. In other words, it is conceivable that even though these findings may not have been 
‘hardened’ into remedies or court orders, they might acquire sufficient political and popular 
currency to direct government action, thus obliquely regulating government behaviour.  
 
The possibility that this would happen is outside of courts’ control, but is not precluded by 
doctrinal respect for the notion of a forbidden area. The importance of this kind of impact is 
clearest when one analyses judicial effectiveness through the prism of regulatory 
constitutionalism proposed above. Seen thus, judicial review is one part of a broader cultural 
commitment to the rule of law and accountability that includes legal, political, popular, 
external and internal elements. In this context, judicial decisions that appear to carry 
inappropriate or inadequate remedies (or, indeed, no traditional remedy at all) might still play 
an important role by catalysing a broader constitutionalist demand for accountability with the 
potential to make clear the standards expected of government from a normative perspective 
and to bring about changes in behaviour accordingly. Viewed thus, they seem less 
disappointing to the constitutionalist.   
 
The second factor suggesting that maintaining the ‘forbidden area’ in respect of external 
questions while identifying and displaying muscularity in relation to internal questions are 
mutually reconcilable and appropriate judicial approaches is that the principles laid down and 
enforced through the muscular handling of the internal question may ‘leak’ into external 
affairs and have knock-on constitutionalist effects in a typically regulatory fashion. Such 
effects might, of course, be either negative or positive; both formal and informal responses to 
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judicial review are possible and, indeed, negative reactions (such as ouster clauses or the 
effective limitation of the availability of judicial review
51
) are a distinct possibility that I do 
not mean here to discount. It is important to recall that in handing down a decision in any 
case of judicial review, courts can be sure only of what they themselves will do; the reaction 
of the other branches of government is beyond their direct control, however where there is a 
clear culture of respect for decisions of the courts we can be relatively sure that even 
decisions unfavourable to the government will not simply be ignored. Negative reactions to 
judicial review may not be the ideal reaction when seen from the perspective of the 
‘outcome’ narrowly construed, but they too reflect the nature of judicial review as regulatory 
constitutionalism bringing about changed behaviours. The most worrying outcome from a 
constitutionalist perspective would be for the state to simply ignore a decision of a Court, 
undermining the delicate arrangement whereby political branches give effect to the decisions 
of the ‘weakest’ branch of government. 
 
Taking that into account, we can explore further some of the positive reactions that decisions 
such as Munaf, Khadr and Rahmatullah might help to bring about. The first is that the 
respondent government might modify its interactions with other states using the finding as a 
basis. One can easily imagine that in a subsequent interaction relating to the handing of a 
British subject over to the US in Iraq or Afghanistan, for example, the UK authorities might 
stress to the US authorities the importance of ensuring compliance with the Geneva 
Conventions and having in place an effective mechanism of recovering the individual if 
required based on wanting to avoid a repeat of the criticism levied in Rahmatullah. Indeed, 
the UK might even become more reluctant to hand detainees over in such circumstances at 
all. In this way the fact that the findings relating to the external question did not ‘harden’ into 
mandatory orders does not necessarily mean that there is no impact on the external actor (the 
detaining state) in this and similar cases. Of course, there is no guarantee that this actually 
will happen; political considerations such as relative geopolitical power positions, desirability 
of outcome, government priorities and perceived necessity are likely to impact on the extent 
to which such a direct ‘leak’ into external relations would take place. However, the 
possibility of such leakage reminds us that even if an area is formally ‘forbidden’ to the 
courts in terms of adjudication, their findings can impact on it in terms of action. 
 
Furthermore, findings as to the external question might impact on external relations as a 
result of their reflexive capacity.  Reflexivity here represents a middle-way between detailed, 
‘command and control’ regulation and absolute deregulation (at least in public regulatory 
terms).
52
 Reflexive regulation (sometimes also termed ‘reflexive law’ or ‘reflexive 
governance’) is concerned with stimulating self-regulation in a manner that ensures that 
social policies are fulfilled.
53
 While usually applied to industry sectors,
54
 the concept of 
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reflexive regulation also has potential in an area such as foreign affairs (especially in 
wartime) when too strong a judicial hand is considered institutionally inappropriate. 
Reflexive governance is essentially governance by design, whereby certain institutions allow 
for the marrying of legal principles with the structural contexts in which they are to be 
applied. In the context of external relations, we might say that the bridging institution here 
would be the public service within the relevant government department (most likely 
departments or ministries of defence and foreign relations), possibly including the diplomatic 
service and the military.  
 
The impact of judicial review on public servants and institutions has been well studied. 
Sunkin, Calvo and Platt have found that judicial review has significant impact in the local 
authority context, not least because of the bedded down public service ethos to be found 
there. In this respect they found that a mere challenge (whether successful or not) can have 
some (limited) impact on the quality of local authority services. Furthermore, if a challenge 
reaches the level of a judgment of a court there is a clear impact on the respondent 
particularly, but not exclusively, where the court finds against the local authority. Third, a 
decision against Local Authority A can have an impact on the behaviour of Local Authority 
B which can now be clear on what is required of it and modify its behaviour to act 
accordingly partly to avoid being subjected to judicial review itself, and partly because of an 
ethos that compliance with the law is simply what public authorities ought to do.
55
 Even 
taking into account the differences between local and national authorities, an understanding 
of judicial review as an exercise of regulatory constitutionalism shows that it at least has the 
potential for similar impacts at national level. Added to this we ought to take into account the 
growth of ‘accountability culture’ in public authorities and its capacity to influence the extent 
to which challenges—whether successful in remedies terms or not—may impact on 
individual public servant behaviour and contribute to broader behavioural change when 
understood in a reflexive manner.
56
 Furthermore, the statutory obligation now placed on 
public authorities in some jurisdictions—including the UK57—to undertake its activities in a 
manner compliant with the state’s obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, may further catalyse reflexive responsiveness even to ‘soft’ and oblique findings 
relating to the treatment of citizens or subjects held by another state but with sufficient nexus 
to the respondent state. If we assume (and it may, to be fair, be an assumption too far in some 
cases of extremity) that compliance with international law, respect for human rights, and the 
maintenance of good diplomatic relations are all social policies to which the state is 
committed, and that the relevant elements of the public service are already acculturated to 
taking judicial pronouncements on board and cognisant of the potential fall-out from further 
‘external’ findings that obliquely criticise strategic partners as well as identifying possible 
complicity in violations of international law, it is not unreasonable to expect that such 
pronouncements may have a reflexive impact in the design and implementation—at 
departmental and government level—of approaches to particular, ‘high-risk’ inter-state 
engagement concerning citizens (or subjects) detained abroad.  
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Conclusion 
 
It is no doubt frustrating for litigants, their families, scholars and commentators when courts 
hand down decisions that appear to find wrongdoing while ‘doing nothing’ about it. There are 
plentiful examples of scholars arguing that courts being relatively non-deferential while the 
litigants continue to linger in detention is a sheer exposition of the futility of the language and 
principles of human rights as a matter of law, or illustrates something akin to duplicity or 
connivance.
58
  These critiques of course have their merits, especially when applied to the 
cases of individuals whose names and stories have become synonymous with great 
constitutionalist ‘victories’ but who remain in deplorable conditions of liberty deprivation. 
However, when it comes to citizens (or subjects) detained abroad real questions of legitimate 
limitations on judicial muscularity arise that exacerbate the usual challenges of judicial 
review in situations of emergency or crisis. Not only does a court have to think about whether 
it is appropriate to intervene in what the government is directly engaged in, but it must also 
take into consideration a wide range of broader considerations about comity, institutional 
capacities, and diplomatic relations. Doing this does not undermine judicial review when it is 
seen as an exercise of regulatory constitutionalism in a context where judicial 
pronouncements have both an autonomous and a contextual force. 
 
A court could quite conceivably apply the kinds of weighty considerations that arise in cases 
of this kind in order to avoid meaningful adjudication. Less likely, but nevertheless 
conceivable, is a court disregarding these considerations in order to take a stringent approach 
to assessing the foreign affairs elements of such cases. Realistically speaking, neither of these 
approaches would be particularly wise. In both cases, the individual in question would most 
likely find himself precisely where he always was and some fundamental relationship (either 
between judiciary and the executive, or between the respondent and the detaining state) 
would be seriously wounded. The three cases considered here suggest that courts are, in fact, 
finding a middle ground between these two extreme situations. By carving the issues up into 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions the courts have identified a space of muscularity and a 
space of self-restraint, but the self-restraint need not equate to abandonment by the courts 
when the regulatory capacity of the external findings is taken into account. This may not be 
ideal, and it may not secure the liberty or the welfare of the detainee, but it at least reinforces 
core constitutional principles and holds some potential to influence states’ behaviour in such 
cases. Whether one is a judicial review sceptic or enthusiast, it is difficult to imagine what 
more a domestic court could do.   
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